Ukraine defense ministry shoots itself in the foot

In mid-2024, as the war in Ukraine ground into a third year and Western military aid showed ominous signs of flagging, Kyiv and its friends in Europe began moving toward a different approach: producing weapons closer to the fighting, on Ukrainian soil. This would require help from Europe and the U.S.—significant funding and oversight. But it promised in the long haul to reduce Ukrainian dependence on the West and, after the war, to provide a powerful new arsenal for Europe.

Denmark was the first country to participate, followed by other northern European nations, and early efforts were promising. Altogether in 2024, what became known as the “Danish model” provided more than a half billion dollars for Ukrainian weapons production, and the approach was warmly welcomed in Kyiv, with President Volodymyr Zelensky and others calling for its expansion in 2025.

Then, astonishingly, in late January, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov suspended the well-regarded director of the agency that had made the new approach possible by bringing transparency and accountability to the agency that purchases weapons and ammunition for the Ukrainian army.

The move ignited a firestorm of criticism from anti-corruption activists and Western diplomats. Many saw a throwback to another era: an overreaching executive branch eager to protect itself and its associates firing a reformer intent on eliminating corruption. The two sides fought it out for several days in full public view—a byzantine game of bureaucratic chess and legal maneuvering. But by the end of the week, agency head Maryna Bezrukova had been formally dismissed, and the supervisory board created at NATO’s urging to guide and oversee the agency had been stripped of its power.

The stakes could hardly be higher for Ukraine. Even as Ukrainians struggle on the battlefield to expel Russian troops, they are also fighting on the home front to root out centuries of Russian and Soviet influence—not just corruption but, arguably more damaging, authoritarian government unchecked by independent institutions. Ukraine has made huge strides in the past decade, as Kyiv devolved much of its power and worked with civil society activists to create a network of independent institutions that check the executive branch. But every now and then, old habits come to the fore.

The West is watching closely. Not just financing for the defense industry but also, much more broadly, future investment in Ukrainian reconstruction and development will depend on Western confidence that the rule of law prevails in Kyiv.

Well-Regarded Defense Official Abruptly Dismissed

In Ukraine, as in many countries, military procurement has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy and susceptible to shady dealings. In 2015, Kyiv instituted a world-renowned online system, ProZorro, to make public contracting fully transparent, cutting back insider influence and saving millions of dollars at all levels of government. But the defense ministry held off participating for reasons of security. Then, in 2023, two big scandals rocked the armed forces, resulting in the dismissal of former minister, Oleksii Reznikov.

The new Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) was an ingenious solution to this problem. It oversees only lethal purchases—weapons and ammunition—allowing all other military spending to be made public on ProZorro. Appointed as director in early 2024, Maryna Bezrukova had a long history as a reformer—she had cleaned up procurement at Ukraine’s giant state-owned electric company, UkrEnergo. Her mission at DPA seemed clear enough: to spend its allotted budget, some $7 billion in 2024, in as transparent and efficient a manner as possible, eliminating shady third parties that bought weaponry abroad and sold it to Kyiv at inflated prices.

Bezrukova and her team achieved impressive results in 2024. The first step was overhauling internal procedures, conducting rigorous due diligence before deals were signed and rearranging payment schedules to ensure that firms delivered on their contracts. By year’s end, DPA had reduced the share of weapons buys flowing to third-party dealers from 81% to 12%, with 61% of contracts now going to Ukrainian manufacturers.

Kyiv’s Western partners, previously reluctant to invest in Ukrainian weapons production for fear of shady dealings—corruption, mismanagement, and unenforceable contracts—took note. In June, Denmark became the first country to provide financing for a DPA weapons purchase—the experiment that became the Danish model.

Still, for all this success—or perhaps because of it—the DPA began encountering obstacles. Bezrukova received threatening phone calls. Sensitive personal information was made public on social media. Other officials at the ministry complained about her work, and defense minister Umerov started to talk about shutting down the agency. His accusation: that Bezrukova was too focused on getting media attention and not delivering weapons to the front.

In fall 2024, NATO intervened, blocking the ministry from closing the DPA and urging Kyiv to create an independent board—reputable Ukrainian and international defense experts—to oversee Bezrukova’s team. But the day before the board’s first meeting, the defense minister moved to undermine its authority, engineering a revision of its charter so that he rather than the independent supervisory group would control hirings and firings at the agency. In January, the board voted unanimously to extend the director’s contract for another year. But Umerov had a different idea. Just days later, he fired two members of the board and replaced Bezrukova.

Civil society reformers blitzed social media with angry denunciations of the ministry. Influential legislator, Anastasia Radina, who chairs the parliamentary committee on corruption, denounced Bezrukova’s dismissal as illegal and called for the defense minister to resign. A few days later, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau opened an investigation to determine if Umerov had abused the power of his office.

“The ministry of defense’s refusal to recognize the supervisory board’s extension of the contract will have devastating consequences,” anti-corruption crusader Daria Kaleniuk wrote in a guest column in Ukrainska Pravda, “for the supply of weapons to the army and the Danish model.”

The ‘Danish Model’ Is A Win-Win for Europe And Ukraine

The new Danish approach to Ukrainian weapons development was born of necessity. Copenhagen has been at the forefront of European efforts to provide Kyiv with military aid. Although its total giving, €7.5 from February 2022 through October 2024, paled in comparison to Washington’s €89 billion, for Denmark, this represented a whopping 2.3% of GDP. By early 2024, Copenhagen could no longer spare anything more from the dwindling store of weapons it relies on for its own defense. The one thing it could provide was money, and encouraged by the sterling record of the new procurement agency, it began exploring the possibility of investing directly in Ukrainian weapons production.

Ukraine is well-positioned to make use of the funding. Ukrainian engineers once played an integral part in the Soviet defense industry. Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a leading global supplier of IT services and digital innovation, and its defense industry has been growing robustly since the war began in 2022. Wartime regulations prevent these manufacturers from exporting what they produce. But their sole client, the central government, operates on an extremely limited budget, buying only an estimated 30% of what the industry could have produced in 2024.

Copenhagen’s innovative approach solves all these problems. Denmark continues to support the war effort with direct financing for Ukrainian defense production. This helps Ukrainian firms produce at full capacity, increasing the flow of weapons and ammunition to badly strapped Ukrainian troops. Direct funding is faster than conventional military aid. Weapons production is cheaper in Ukraine than in Denmark or elsewhere in the West, and Ukrainian manufacturers are much better positioned than Europeans to respond to developments on the ever-changing front line in eastern Ukraine.

Bezrukova’s team and Copenhagen worked together to funnel Danish financing. Kyiv chose the companies and products most in need of investment. Danish defense experts audited the manufacturers and, once a contract was signed, followed up to ensure delivery of the weapons. In 2024, Denmark helped boost Ukrainian production of artillery systems, long-range drones, and anti-tank missiles. By the end of December, according to Zelensky, Danish financing was paying for the production of 20 Bohdana self-propelled artillery systems per month, compared to just six in December 2023.

By the end of 2024, Sweden, Finland, and Lithuania were following in Denmark’s footsteps and contributing directly to Ukrainian weapons production. Funding is still relatively limited—it meets only a fraction of Ukraine’s defense needs. But Danish defense minister Troels Lund Poulsen predicts the model could produce $1.4 billion in European investment in 2025.

Even with Bezrukova now officially out, much remains uncertain. The DPA stood all but idle for more than a week, leaving contracts in limbo at a time when troops are running desperately short of weapons and ammunition. Zelensky has said nothing, despite growing appeals to intervene, including from the national association of defense manufacturers. Legislation designed to guarantee the independence of institutions like the DPA in a position to check executive power is languishing in parliament. Also still uncertain: whether and to what degree allies like Denmark are reconsidering their support for Ukrainian defense production.

Ambassadors representing the G7 nations cautioned Kyiv to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible. “Consistency with good governance principles and NATO recommendations is important,” they warned, “to maintain the trust of the public and international partners.”