During a National Assembly Diplomatic and Unification Committee audit on Oct. 13, 2017, a lawmaker asked the South Korean government, “North Korea is secretly operating some Kaesong Industrial Complex facilities – what electricity source are they using to run these factories?” Then-Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon responded, “I understand they receive electricity from a nearby hydroelectric power plant,” referring to the Yesong River Youth Hydroelectric Power Plant.
The Yesong River Youth Power Plant consists of six electricity-generating facilities, numbered 1 through 6. It’s reported that North Korea received U.N. approval for carbon emission rights for three of these facilities. However, there are no known cases of North Korea actually selling these carbon credits to foreign entities for profit. Using high-resolution satellite imagery, I examined the current status of the Yeseong River Youth Power Plant and investigated North Korea’s carbon credit trading issues.
The Yesong River is located just north of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Six hydroelectric power plants, numbered 1 through 6, operate across a wide area stretching from the Hwanggang Dam’s No. 1 plant through North Hwanghae province’s Tosan Town, Pyongsan county, and Geumcheon Ccounty. The distance from the Kaesong Industrial Complex to Power Plant No. 6 is 25 kilometers in a straight line. The Yesong River originates from Mount Eonjin in North Hwanghae province’s Suan county and flows into the West Sea of the Korean Peninsula through Ganghwa Bay between South Hwanghae province’s Baecheon county and Kaesong’s Gaepung county.
The Hwanggang Dam is located in Hwanggang village, Tosan county, North Hwanghae province. During the rainy season, North Korea has often released reservoir water without notifying South Korea, causing human casualties and property damage from flooding and washouts to South Korean residents living in the downstream Imjin River basin. This problematic dam receives attention from South Korean media every summer due to concerns about flooding in the lower Imjin River.
The name of the Hwanggang Dam itself can be confusing. Though the water passing through is from the Imjin River, it’s not called the Imjin Dam. South Koreans call it the Hwanggang Dam because of the place name “Hwanggang village.” In contrast, North Korea calls it the “Yesong River Dam” because the reservoir water is diverted westward to join the main Yesong River. The Yesong River Youth Power Plant No. 1 is located at the Hwanggang Dam. Power Plant No. 1 has a capacity of 40,000 kW and was completed in 2008. No. 2 was completed in 2010, and No. 3 in 2017.
Because North Korea diverts the Hwanggang Dam water westward toward the Yesong River for hydroelectric power generation, the flow of the Imjin River has actually decreased. Of the six Yesong River Youth Hydroelectric Power Plants that begin at the Hwanggang Dam, No. 4 was completed in 2014, No. 5 in December 2018, and No. 6 in 2010.
Among the Yesong River Youth Hydroelectric Power Plants, Nos. 1, 2, and 6 were built before 2011 during Kim Jong Il’s era, while the remaining Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were constructed after Kim Jong Il’s death. North Korea applied to the U.N. for carbon credit approval for all six hydroelectric power plants, including Nos. 3, 4, and 5, which were built after Kim Jong Un took power. It’s reported that the U.N. validation process has been completed and final approval granted. Let’s examine these eco-friendly facility carbon credits that North Korea has supposedly acquired.
North Korean hydroelectric power plants’ carbon credits and trading cases
Carbon Emission Rights are a system established by the United Nations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, a major cause of global warming. The system was implemented in 1997 with the Kyoto Protocol, which was proposed as a specific implementation plan for the international Climate Change Convention in Kyoto, Japan. Under this system, the U.N. sets greenhouse gas emission allowances for each country, and countries that emit more must purchase rights from other nations, while those that emit less can sell their rights to other countries for profit.
Since February 2011, North Korea has been working through a Czech energy company to register six hydroelectric power plants as eco-friendly facilities recognized by the UN Climate Convention, including Yesong River Youth Power Plants No. 3, 4, and 5, Hamhung No. 1 Hydroelectric Power Plant, Geumya Power Plant, and Baekdusan Songun Youth Power Plant No. 2. According to Radio Free Asia, North Korea’s applications for U.N. approval of these carbon credit facilities were all completed by the end of 2012.
Through these six eco-friendly hydroelectric power plants, North Korea can potentially reduce carbon dioxide by approximately 200,000 tons annually, which can be traded as Carbon Credits/CERs with polluting companies in other countries. However, there have been no reports of North Korea officially trading carbon credits with other countries.
There are several reasons for North Korea’s lack of carbon credit trading:
First, North Korea’s participation in and cooperation with international systems and practices is minimal. In fact, there are no cases of North Korea participating in international carbon market mechanisms (such as CDM) or registering certified projects.
Second, North Korea lacks the technical and institutional infrastructure. Carbon credit trading requires transparent procedures for measuring, certifying, and registering emissions. North Korea’s systems do not meet international standards, and the country has shown an uncooperative attitude toward external monitoring and control.
Third, sanctions and political issues present obstacles. As North Korea faces sanctions from the U.N. and the international community, even carbon credit trading as a means of earning foreign currency is likely to be hindered by financial sanctions.
In summary, for North Korea to sell hydroelectric power plant carbon credits to other countries for profit, its trading system must meet international standards, undergo external monitoring and inspection through transparent procedures, and build mutual credit and trust as a normal member of the international community. Given North Korea’s closed society, the possibility of actually trading carbon credits earned from eco-friendly power plants in the international market appears low.
